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Irony and Aequabilitas : Horace, 
Satires 1.31
Jerome Kemp
1 The third of Horace’s opening ‘diatribe’ satires is the most systematic in terms of the
consequentiality of its argument.2 The argument runs, logically enough, as follows : after
an  opening  section  on  consistency  (aequabilitas)/inconsistency  (a  theme  which  runs
throughout the satire), Horace turns to consistency in the appraisal of one’s own and
one’s  friends’  faults :  there must  be balance (aequabilitas)  between the two,  and this,
practically, amounts to tolerance of friends’ faults (25-95). From 76 tolerance and fairness
in appraising friends’ transgressions comes to include the judgment of crimes in society
generally, and so introduces the section from 96 which deals with fairness (aequabilitas) in
justice.3 The link between friendship and justice in Horace’s argument reflects the pre-
existing  link  between  these  subjects  in  Hellenistic  thought,  both  in  Stoicism  and
Epicureanism. And the end of this last section (124-142) also acts as a conclusion to the
whole  satire,  where  Horace  upholds  tolerance  and fairness  in  friendship  and justice
against Stoic rigidity and extremism.
2 Although the underlying philosophical concept that runs through Satire 1.3, aequabilitas,
is (as we will see) mainly identifiable with the Stoics, in comparison with the other so-
called ‘diatribe’ satires,1.3 is notable for its pronounced anti-Stoic stance.4 Horace’s ironic
handling of this Stoic tenet, and of philosophical material throughout the satire has, as
yet, been somewhat overlooked. This discussion concerns the particular way in which
Horace links aequabilitas with moderation, to promote his own, mainly Epicurean view of
friendship and tolerance ; the uncovering of irony introduced by the theme of aequabilitas
 ; and how Horace’s use of philosophical material throughout enhances the sentiment and
structure of his argument.
 
Moderation and Consistency
3 In so far  as  consistency (aequabilitas)  is  represented in 1.3,  it  is  closely connected to
moderation. There are in fact obvious connective similarities with the previous satire –
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1.2,  which explicitly  concerned moderation in the conduct  of  one’s  sex life  –  in  the
opening section of 1.3 ; and indeed 1.3 generally has been seen as a continuation of the
moderation theme which runs through this first triad of ‘diatribe’ satires.5 For example,
in  1.2  (1-4)  Horace  uses  the  death  of  Tigellius  Sardus  to  introduce  the  theme  of
moderation ;  in  1.3,  from 3 to  19  Tigellius  is  described as  someone who exemplified
inconsistency. At 1.3.9 Horace defines Tigellius in the statement, nil aequale homini fuit illi,
(reminiscent of nil medium est at 1.2.28) and then gives further examples of the man’s
absurd  inconsistency,  which  is  summed  up,  or  rather  parenthesised,  by  the  further
statement : nil fuit umquam sic impar sibi (19) ; and this can be compared with the similarly
parenthetical 1.2.24/1.2.28, in the opening preamble on moderation/excess in 1.2. The
fact that Horace deliberately treats consistency as similar to moderation in this opening
section – bearing in mind 1.2 – is significant when we come to view his inter-relation of
philosophical ideas as the satire progresses.
4 Importantly, and, as we will see, somewhat ironically in a poem which is largely an attack
on Stoic  extremism,  aequabilitas was particularly upheld by the Stoics  (e.g.  Cicero De
officiis 1.90 and 111 ; De amicitia 65 and 92) ;6 its implication not merely being adherence to
the same behaviour pattern, but to behaviour that is consistently rational and controlled
and therefore reliable, and unaffected by vicissitude. On aequabilitas as a Stoic tenet Dyck
remarks, with reference to De officiis (a work which represents, particularly in books 1 and
2, the views of the Stoic Panaetius) : “The Stoics held that all the sage’s individual actions
were  correct  and  thus  self-consistent  (SVF 1.  52.27-29)…  the  self-consistency  that
Panaetius [in De officiis] recommends is thus modelled on that of the sage.”7 Also, the
original Zenonian definition of the τέλος :  ὁμολογουμένως  ζῆν  (to live in agreement)
strongly suggests  consistency,  as  does the later  ὁμολογουμένως  τῇ  φύσει  ζῆν  –  also
referring to internal consistency in one’s life, and the Stoic notion of the well-flowing life,
εὔροια βίου (LS 63A-B).
5 This  self-consistency  is  very  much  a  part  of  –  in  some  respects  practically
indistinguishable from – moderation as part of temperate living ; and indeed Tigellius’
inconsistencies up to 19 could also be regarded as excesses. For example, his tendency
was to walk too quickly or too slowly (9-11)8 or, at 15-17 :
….......     …decies centena dedisses
huic parco, paucis contento, quinque diebus
nil erat in loculis.
Suppose you’d given a million to this frugal, easily satisfied individual : within five
days his pockets were sure to be empty.9
6 The connection with the Stoics – and in particular Panaetius – as being upholders of
consistency is perhaps specifically suggested in Tigellius’ inconsistent walking, since this
is advised against in De officiis, at 1.131, where Cicero also refers to an excessively slow
walk as looking like walking in a procession.10 Indeed, the references to consistency given
above from De officiis and De amicitia uphold this relationship between consistency and
moderation : consistency being regarded in a practical – one could feasibly say, Panaetian
11 – light, rather than as strict, inflexible adherence to particular modes of thought and
behaviour, as would be expected in the Stoic sage,12 even if the Stoic sage is the ideal
model for aequabilitas ; indeed it is notable that the Panaetian De officiis 1 is where we find
particular emphasis on the qualities of aequabilitas and constantia (consistency – in many
contexts practically a synonym of aequabilitas).13 In this more practical context Horace
would appear at first (1.3.1-24) to be supporting Panaetian Stoicism, but, as will become
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apparent, in 1.3 Horace takes on certain Stoic ideas discussed in the first book of De officiis
,  on  consistency,  reason  (ratio),  and  the  nature  of  human  society  and  justice,  and
ironically uses them to attack Stoic extremism ;  and in so doing Horace aligns these
virtues,  in particular that of consistency,  with Epicurean moderation. It  must also be
noted that both moderation – the mean – and philia were central to Aristotelian ethics,14
and indeed the Aristotelian influence in the first three diatribe satires, which all deal with
moderation and the mean to some extent, has been extensively covered,15 though here I
focus  on  Horace’s  particular  concentration  on  the  more  recognisably  Stoic  idea  of
consistency, and his consequent alignment of it with Epicurean moderation.
7 This alignment first becomes apparent when Horace moves on to discuss the subject of
friendship at 25-53. In connection with the opening section on consistency, friendship is
at  first  related to  the inconsistent  way in  which men regard their  friends’  faults  as
disproportionately greater than their own. This inconsistency is also immoderate, and in
highlighting this point Horace alludes to Lucretius, comparing this tendency with that of
lovers  who  go  to  the  other  extreme,  by  indulging  or  even  praising  their  beloved’s
shortcomings : 1.3.38-40 :
illuc praevertamur, amatorem quod amicae
turpia decipiunt caecum vitia, aut etiam ipsa haec
delectant, veluti Balbinum polypus Hagnae.
Let’s  turn our  attention to  this  point,  that  the  unsightly  defects  of  a  girlfriend
escape her lover, in his blindness, or even actually delight him, as Hagna’s wen did
Balbinus.
8 The allusion is to DRN 4.1153-54, and it is also reminiscent of Sat. 1.2.90ff where Horace
says that one should not be too fussy, on the one hand, nor be too blind to a woman’s
blemishes, on the other : the context in both involves the common sense of moderate
detachment, and (in Sat. 1.2 in particular)16 of being satisfied with what is natural and
necessary – according to the Epicurean view of moderation.17 Again, Horace also alludes
to Lucretius at 43-49, in describing the indulgent way a father would regard his son’s
faults :
at pater ut gnati, sic nos debemus amici
si quod sit vitium non fastidire :  strabonem
appellat paetum pater, et pullum, male parvus
si cui filius est, ut abortivus fuit olim
Sisyphus… (43-47)
But, supposing a friend has some defect, we ought, just like a father with his son,
not to feel disgust at it ; a father talks of a cross-eyed son as ‘having a cast’, and calls
him ‘wee chick’ if he’s woefully stunted like the midget Sisyphus…
9 Here Horace inverts Lucretius’ list of the unctuous euphemisms which men attribute to
their objects of desire at DRN 4.1160-69 (the comparison which Horace himself makes at
38-40)18 so as to support indulgence of faults rather than criticism.19 It may seem, in fact,
that in suggesting that men indulge their friends’ faults he is suggesting a somewhat
immoderate  course  of  action.  However,  the  point  is  clearly  that  such  indulgence  is
necessary to counter the more excessive tendency for men to overlook their own faults
and exaggerate those of  their  friends :  indeed in a sense Horace is  here advising an
application of aequabilitas, as balance, from a detached, moderate Epicurean perspective.20
10 Balance is thus apparent in Horace’s view that criticism of oneself should be consistent
with criticism of one’s friends : i.e. do not be over-critical of friends and under-critical of
oneself.  To  counteract  such  a  tendency  and  so  restore aequabilitas  Horace  suggests
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indulgence of friends’ faults. Horace’s advocacy of balance is in this respect ironically
tempered  by  his  use  of  philosophical  material.  Horace  is  using  an  Epicurean source
(Lucretius)  to  back  up  the  notion  of  aequabilitas (most  identifiable  with  the  Stoics)
through the Epicurean view of moderate detachment in order to save oneself from an
excessive tendency (one based on false/empty opinion), while in turn implicitly attacking
Stoic inflexibility and extremism ; though the fact that the Stoics are the target of attack
only becomes explicit from 96 with reference to the Stoic paradox, that all sins are equal.
11 The reasoning behind Horace’s views on balance as tolerance can be seen to derive in
other ways from Epicurean moderation. Between 68 and 75 he concludes that one should
aim at fairness in regarding the faults of one’s friends, which is suggestive of moderation.
At  68,  nam  vitiis  nemo  sine  nascitur ;  ‘for  no  one  is  born  without  faults’,  seems  to
complement the Epicurean view expressed at 76-7, that faults cannot be eradicated :
denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae
cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia…
Again, since the fault of anger, and the others likewise which have a grip on the
victims of folly, can’t be completely cut out….
12 As Lucretius DRN 3.307-322 : 310 :
nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst.21
13 The idea that one is born with faults and that they cannot be completely cut out suggests
that for Horace one’s own faults can only, realistically, be moderated.22
14 Horace’s personal interpretation of ratio at 78 is another ironic jibe against the Stoics.23
Having made the point that one’s faults cannot be completely removed, Horace suggests
that  ratio be  used  in  implementing  a  sense  of  balance  and  fairness  in  judging
misdemeanours ; ratio – a quality particularly prized by the Stoics, and indeed by Cicero/
Panaetius in De officiis 124 – is thus brought in to uphold the Epicurean view of moderation
and fairness against Stoic extremism, and the view, (irrational, in Horace’s opinion) at 96,
that all sins are equal. 
15 So,  in  taking  on  the  Stoic  theme  of  consistency  Horace  aligns  this  with  Epicurean
moderation.  And, as we will  see,  the ironic nature of this alignment of philosophical
views,  as  well  as  his  handling  of  the  theme  of  consistency  in  other  respects  –  in
connection with friendship and tolerance,  and in his subsequent use of philosophical
sources – enhances this anti-Stoic position.
 
Friendship : Consistency and Irony ; Tolerance and
Criticism
16 Horace’s use of philosophical material, sometimes tinged with humour, and the unstable,
casual nature of the satire form has led some to doubt whether the philosophical content
in these satires should be taken seriously at all.25 However, this view could come close to
regarding the humour (which still relies on a knowledge of the philosophical material :
the satirist as shoddy moralist), and instability of the form as essentially contradicting
what Horace regards as a particular characteristic of satire at 1.24-25 (quamquam ridentem
dicere  verum/ quid  vetat) :26 the mixture of  the serious  and the humorous ;  indeed the
underlying message, the truth (verum) is the important, moral purpose of Horatian satire.
27
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17 Certainly, to some extent we should be amused at the rather glib use of philosophical
ideas to back up arguments involving how to conduct a (reasonably) contented sex life in
1.2, for example, as Turpin notes ;28 but this does not mean that the satirist should be seen
wholly as an incompetent moralist, even if Horace does present the satirist persona as at
times rather  careless  in  his  formulation  of  argument,  and  rather  easy  with  certain
philosophical dicta.29 As we will see in Satire 1.3, the association of philosophical ideas,
Horace’s deliberate manipulation of them – even if sometimes so as to appear casual – in
the end serves to put forward an underlying philosophical position ; if anything Horace’s
apparently casual use of ethical doctrine, his humour, in fact, demonstrates a satirist who
is very much in control of the moral content in his work, and who uses the instability and
humour of satire to strengthen particular philosophical arguments and the underlying
moral seriousness of the poems. Because of the casual,  almost apparently ramshackle
nature of the satires, ethics is put in a recognisable, practical context, as it was in the
street sermon diatribes, from which Horace draws.30 The irony in the moralising should
not be regarded as undermining the moral content or making it practically worthless – if
that were the case the irony would lose much of its effect.31
18 In Satire 1.3 Horace’s position with regard to aequabilitas is ironic, and this is first implied
in  the  introductory  section :  Horace’s  criticisms  of  the  singer  Tigellius  (for  his
inconsistency) seem somewhat hypocritical set against his main argument from 25, which
is tolerance of faults.32 More specifically, at 19-20 Horace imagines someone taking him to
task about his criticisms of Tigellius :
….......................... nunc aliquis dicat mihi “quid tu ?
nullane habes vitia ? “immo alia et fortasse minora.
At this point someone may say to me “What about you ? Haven’t you any faults ?’
Yes, but others, and perhaps they’re smaller.
19 The irony here is that, after having said this Horace actually goes on to criticise men who
regard their own faults as less serious than those of the friends they criticise (25-37).
Indirectly Horace is thus criticising himself : Horace himself, it seems, is being somewhat
inconsistent. Also, a source of irony lies in the subject matter – criticism of intolerance of
others’ faults (coupled with a disregard for one’s own faults) – since this would appear to
be an odd subject for a satirist to attack : a primary function of the satirist being to be
critical of others’ faults. In deftly, and ironically, showing how easy it is to fall prey to
inconsistency,  Horace  actually  exemplifies  the  seriousness  –  the  truth  –  of  the
philosophical subject that runs through the poem : a good example of quamquam ridentem
dicere verum/ quid vetat.
20 It may also be noted that Horace’s satire is not particularly severe, and perhaps this pro-
tolerance argument in 1.3 further suggests this. In Sat.1.4 too Horace maintains that his
criticisms are reasonable : he is not writing satire simply to get cheap laughs (34-5), and
will only criticise those who deserve it (65-70) – and this is further qualified by the fact
that  Horace  rarely  criticises  contemporary  individuals  anyway.  Indeed  Horace’s
argument for tolerance – however touched by irony – taken together with his proclaimed
stance as a satirist in 1.4 suggests that he intends his satire to be regarded not so much as
aggressive, outspoken (and funny) criticism, but as something gentler – his methods of
persuasion, indeed, his irony, as more subtle. But Horace still sees himself as outspoken
critic to some extent,  as is  shown by his wish to be seen in the literary tradition of
Lucilius going back to Old Greek comedy.
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21 In any case, Horace’s stance in 1.3 in particular seems, ironically, somewhat inconsistent ;
and this  is  very  much dependent  on his  use  of  philosophical  dogma :  he  apparently
recommends Stoic aequabilitas, while subtly presenting himself as a poor practitioner of
this virtue, and this is largely why he goes on to recommend tolerance of faults (which, as
we will see, can be regarded as essentially anti-Stoic) : human beings are not perfect : nam
vitiis  nemo  sine  nascitur…68.  Or,  to  put  it  another  way,  Horace’s  interpretation  of
aequabilitas leads him towards Epicurean moderation and tolerance, rather than to Stoic
extremism  and  inflexibility.  The  irony  in  Horace’s  position  as  tolerant  satirist,  his
inconsistency, and his general non-seriousness seem to act as a foil against the inflexible
seriousness of the Stoic ideal of consistency, referred to explicitly from 96 to the end. So
Horace’s irony in fact serves to strengthen a philosophical position.
22 The thrust of the argument in favour of tolerance in friendship, indirectly introduced
through the theme of aequabilitas, can be regarded as Epicurean. To begin with, it could be
that such tolerance would in practice not be too demanding anyway, since perhaps for
Horace friendships should only be formed with people of good character, as is suggested
at Sat.1.6. 69-70 :
….............................. purus et insons
(ut me collaudem) si et vivo carus amicis…
If (to sing my own praises) I live a life which is pure and innocent and endears me
to my friends…
23 This would in fact be in line with the view that one should choose one’s friends after
consideration, recommended by Epicurus (Sent. Vat. 28),33 as well as Laelius in Cicero’s De
amicitia (78).34 However, although this idea would also find favour with the Stoics, the
Stoic view that only the wise can have friendships (Diog. Laert. 7.124, LS 67B= Diog. Laert.
7.32-3) would be too extreme :
Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their
likeness to one another… (Diog. Laert. 7.124).
24 Given that  the Stoic  qualification for  wisdom was,  practically  speaking,  unattainable,
there would be no room for tolerance, as is implied in the polemical stance of Horace’s
argument from 96.35 However, Fraisse (1974 :  348-373) has looked at the Stoic view of
friendship  in  detail,  making the  point  that  the  position that  friendship  only  existed
between the wise was an ideal and that moral progress towards such an ideal was also
important. Also, it has been argued by Steinmetz (1967 : 191, 199) that the Stoic Panaetius
was a source for Cicero’s De amicitia.36 Whether this is so or not,  it  seems likely that
friendship could well have been treated in a more practical context by Panaetius, given
his  more  practical  approach  to  ethics  generally  (see  note  12).37 But  for  Horace  the
extreme nature of the Stoic position that only the wise can enjoy friendship clearly calls
for satirical criticism, and, indeed, the question of the possible Panaetian approach would
still only be a later interpretation ; the extreme nature of the Stoic position, as it stands,
is unequivocal.38
25 But  how  Horace’s  views  on  tolerance  in  friendship  can  be  regarded  as  specifically
Epicurean needs further explanation ; indeed it requires some discussion of the Epicurean
view of friendship. For the Epicureans, friendship was an intrinsic virtue (Sent. Vat. 23)39
and living without friends a source of  pain.  This seems to originate in the idea that
friendship promotes security (and a sense of security)40 through the mutual benefit of the
parties involved : indeed it is said to originate from benefiting (Sent. Vat. 23). Thus one
had to  choose friendship to  avoid a  source of  pain (and to avoid pain is  to  achieve
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pleasure). Such pain could, indeed, come both from the possible poverty, or injury (or
fear  of  such),  which  could  result  from  friendlessness,  as  well  as  from  the  lack  of
friendship as companionship,  which is also a human need.  Also,  the Epicureans were
aware that friendship can carry risks (Sent. Vat. 28). Clearly, if a friend were to meet with
serious misfortune one should not abandon him (Diog. Laert. 10.120), but one should also
remain in the friendship if the friend were committing some kind of injustice, provided
the friend still behaved decently to oneself.41 Rist emphasises the Epicureans’ regard for
pistis, trust, in friendship (Sent. Vat. 34),42 and that this was one of friendship’s particularly
pleasurable qualities : the existence of this trust, in spite of the risks, is what makes the
friendship genuine and, indeed, pleasurable.
26 However, Mitsis and Annas43 regard the Epicurean position on friendship as incompatible
with Epicurean hedonism.44 For Annas the risks of friendship (in essence, the threat of
pain) are at odds with the goal of pleasure. Mitsis is of the view that Epicurus in fact
recognises an end in friendship completely separate from pleasure.45
27 In response to Mitsis, and largely compatible with Rist, O’Connor claims that Epicurean
friendship is in accordance with a hedonistic ethical system. By O’Connor’s reckoning, the
kinds of risks in friendship that trouble Annas would barely exist in genuine Epicurean
friendship (as Epicurus envisaged it). Epicurean friendship should be regarded rather as
“friendly fellowship,”46 based on a mutual understanding of shared philosophical values :
values which denounce greed, ambition, the fear of death, and even physical pain. 
28 Horace’s view of friendship is probably not quite the purist Epicurean kind described by
O’Connor, although in the perhaps less ideal Epicurean friendship practised in 1st Century
B.C.  Rome,  a  sort  of  fellowship of  the wise  is  implied in the idea of  there being an
agreement – foedus – as mentioned by Torquatus in Cicero, Fin. 1.66ff : the friendship is on
Epicurean terms.  This  idea  of  such an agreement  –  for  which Epicurus  felt  no need
because  within  an  Epicurean  community  the  implications  of  such  a  contract  would
already  be  understood  –  is  also  in  keeping  with  the  importance  of  pistis (trust),
emphasised by Rist. This trust would be strengthened by such an agreement, and in turn
strengthen the friendship against risks. This sense of loyalty, of pistis,seems also to be at
the heart of Horace’s views on the importance of tolerance in friendship in Satire 1.3,
particularly  in  its  diametric  opposition  to  Stoic  perfectionism  and  intolerance.  It  is
certainly in keeping with Horace’s readiness to forgive minor misdemeanours (83-95),
and to indulge friends’ faults on the basis that one is a friend, and that one is obliged to
such loyalty, as at 33-35 :
….......at est bonus, ut melior vir
non alius quisquam, at tibi amicus…
But he’s a good man – there’s none better – he’s your friend…
29 Indeed, in effect the only instances where one would question the nature of a friendship
are when this trust, this agreement in friendship, is brought into question :
….....quid faciam si furtum fecerit, aut si
prodiderit commissa fide sponsumve negarii ? (94-95)
What am I to do if he commits theft, or betrays a trust or disowns his pledge ?
30 Clearly, this is why it is important to judge wisely before entering a friendship : that such
an outcome does not arise. If one has trust based on an agreement between like-minded
people, the risks of friendship are worth taking.47
31 However, Horace’s essentially unequivocal position of favouring tolerance, which is most
compatible  with  Epicureanism,  is  also  not  entirely  without  irony.  At  63-67,  when
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referring to his friendship with Maecenas, he depicts himself as being potentially subject
to criticism : 
simplicior quis et est, qualem me saepe libenter
obtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem
aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus :
‘communi sensu plane caret’ inquimus. eheu,
quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam !
Or someone’s rather direct, which is how I may have often blithely shown myself to
you, Maecenas – so as to interrupt a person who is reading or quietly reflecting, and
to pester him with some chatter or other : ‘he’s quite devoid of consideration’ we
pronounce.  How  blindly,  alas,  are  we  sanctioning  an  unkind  precedent  against
ourselves !
32 Even here there is a sense in which although harsh criticism of such behaviour might be
excessive, Horace still recognises that this behaviour is irritating. Certainly we can agree
with Horace that there is nothing wrong with being rather direct (simplicior),  but his
explanation of what this entails perhaps leaves us less sure. In fact, the pest, or ‘bore’ in
1.9 is momentarily brought to mind ; clearly Horace does not want to represent himself in
that bad a light, but it would seem that his position is again tinged with irony. In fact
sermone molestus may be a subtle, self-deprecating reference to the irritating nature of his
own satire.48
33 Again, at 80ff Horace compares the possible extreme reaction of a master to a slave’s
minor transgression of helping himself to left-overs (which is to have him crucified), with
someone over-reacting to the minor offence of a friend by hating and avoiding him ;49 at
90ff Horace gives a few examples of the kinds of trivial offences he means :
comminxit lectum potus mensave catillum
Evandri manibus tritum deiecit ; ob hanc rem,
aut positum ante mea quia pullum in parte catini
sustulit esuriens, minus hoc iucundus amicus
sit mihi ?
He’s  wet the couch while drunk,  or knocked a bowl worn thin by the hands of
Evander off  the table :  is  this,  or his  having,  in his  hunger,  helped himself  to a
chicken served up on my side of the dish, any reason why I should find him a less
agreeable friend ?
34 Although we should take Horace’s point at face value in the run of the argument – that
one should forgive trivial faults, indeed overlook them (85) – there is again some irony
here  in  that  the  misdemeanours  mentioned  would  certainly  cause  most  hosts
considerable annoyance : esuriens can certainly be seen as somewhat tongue-in-cheek. 50
Indeed,  the behaviour here described takes place within the setting of the convivium,
which is where we find uncouth behaviour elsewhere in the Satires (at 1.4.86ff and 2.8),
and  in  these  instances  it  is  clearly  presented  as  being  objectionable.  That  said,  the
misdemeanours Horace describes in this passage (90ff) are presented either as accidental
or at least not deliberately offensive, which is not the case in the behaviour of the boor-
cum-satirist in 1.4 or Nasidienus in 2.8.
35 Horace’s  advocacy of  tolerance of  friends’  faults,  couched within the Stoic  notion of
aequabilitas, would surely oppose the Stoic view that only the virtuous can have friends
which to all  intents  and purposes  means no one at  all,  given that  the truly wise or
virtuous man for the Stoics is as rare as the Phoenix.51 As we have seen, Horace presents
his position somewhat ironically, and this is reflected in his use of philosophical material.
The use of a Lucretian rhetorical device at 1.3.44-54 does not of itself indicate that Horace
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is promoting an Epicurean view, but the explicitly anti-Stoic stance which follows from
96, the importance of trust, and thus tolerance, in Epicurean friendship – even though
even here there is a dash of irony – as well as these Lucretian echoes and the Epicurean
enthusiasm for friendship generally, show that the preceding argument on tolerance of
friends’ faults is Epicurean in spirit.
 
The Link between Friendship and Justice
36 An important aspect of the satire’s progression is the link in Hellenistic thought between
friendship  and  justice,  and  in  the  context  of  1.3  one  can  perhaps  regard  Horace’s
awareness and use of  this  link as  somewhat ironic – though its  aim is  unambiguous
enough : to enhance an anti-Stoic position.52 The satire’s argument, after the introductory
preamble,  consists  of  three  sections  –  on tolerance in  friendship  (25-95),  fairness  in
justice (96-123), and a final section in which Horace concludes his views on tolerance and
fairness  in  friendship  and  justice  against  Stoic  inflexibility  and  intolerance.  The
discussion of tolerance of friends’ faults effectively turns to one of justice at 96 and in so
doing becomes explicitly anti-Stoic. This change is marked by the introduction of and
consequent attack against the Stoic tenet that all transgressions are equal : quis paria esse
fere placuit peccata (96).53 The progression from friendship to justice reflects the inter-
relationship between these sociological subjects in Hellenistic thought, particularly in
Stoicism, a point which has been overlooked by commentators.
37 For the  Stoics  friendship  and justice  were  connected through oikeiosis :54 the  natural
impulse  of  human  beings  to  identify  with  other  human  beings.55 But  perhaps  more
relevant to Horace’s discussion of friendship and justice – particularly in connection with
aequabilitas –  is  what  Cicero/Panaetius  says  about  justice and oikeiosis in  De officiis 1.
Panaetius, as Schofield notes, takes a somewhat different approach from the traditional
orthodox Stoic view.56 Rather than justice being a result of oikeiosis,  due to altruism –
people’s natural concern for others57 – Panaetius sees justice rather as a practical means
by which one should protect the bonds in society which oikeiosis encourages, rather than
as being a natural consequence of oikeiosis, as at Off.1.20 :
sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria.
Of Justice, the first office is that no man should harm another unless he has been
provoked by injustice. (tr. Atkins, Griffin 1991)
38 And  this  comes  directly  after  the  statement  that  kindness  and  generosity  (clearly
associated with friendship) are very much connected with justice :58 thus the link between
friendship and justice through oikeiosis is also clear in this Panaetian context. In fact, at
Off. 1.12, 1.14, Cicero/Panaetius remarks that the important factor in arriving at justice in
order to protect human society is ratio, which, as we have seen, is the very notion which
Horace himself uses to oppose the Stoic view (connected with justice) that all faults are
equal. Indeed Panaetius’ stress on ratio in this respect is notable given Horace’s use of the
term at 78,59 as is the fact that the quality of constantia is also referred to in this section (
Off. 1.11-20,) i.e. at 1.12, 1.14, 1.17 : it seems likely that Horace had this discussion in De
Officiis in mind when he came to write Sat. 1.3.
39 In fact, Panaetius’ view of oikeiosis and its connection with justice – justice as a practical
means  to  protect  human society  –  is  not  dissimilar  to  Lucretius’  sentiments  on  the
practical reason for justice60 at DRN 5.1019 :
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tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes
finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari.
Then  also  neighbours  began  to  join  friendship  amongst  themselves  in  their
eagerness to neither harm nor suffer violence.
40 Or again for Epicurus (cf. RS 31) : the agreement between people not to harm each other –
though the connection with friendship is  also  clear ;  indeed Long regards  the above
passage as describing the “imagined origins” of friendship.61
41 It would seem, in fact, that Horace has Lucretius, and in particular the passage quoted
above (5. 926ff) in mind in the narrative from 96-124, in its didactic style, language and
imagery.  Denique (76),  used as in Lucretius to begin a new section in the argument,62
foreshadows the Lucretian-style polemic to come from 96, as does the aforementioned
Lucretian  idea  that  faults  cannot  be  completely  eradicated  (76-77).  At  109-111  the
depiction of  human beings,  pre-justice,  as  snatching random love  (Venerem incertam)
echoes  DRN 5.962 ;  more  ferarum (109)  directly  echoes  Lucretius  5.932. 63 Horace’s
description of the arrival of language as being the starting point for civilised society
(104-6) may also derive from what Lucretius says at greater length at 5.1011-91.64 At 107,
the mention of Helen’s adultery with Paris, which is linked with Horace’s view of the
possible  violent  repercussions  from  Venerem  incertam,  before  the  introduction  of
conventional law, may also be connected with Lucretius’ depiction of Paris’ love for Helen
(which led to the Trojan War) at DRN 1.473-477.65 Although the use of the obscenity cunnus
is clearly an obscene, satirical touch,66 it is also possible that cunnus is a pun on kunos
(bitch) as rendered twice in the Iliad 6.344/356, where Helen is describing herself in such
pejorative terms, as being the cause of war. Thus, this obscenity itself is linked to Homer,
and in turn Lucretius.67
42 But the fact that Horace is also likely to be aware of the connection between friendship
and justice in Stoic, and more particularly Panaetian (as dictated by ratio) oikeiosis here is
perhaps partly indicated by the fact that he begins this passage as an explicit attack
against a Stoic position, as well as by the way in which Horace himself ironically uses ratio
– as if from an Epicurean perspective – to make this attack. Horace’s critical response to
the Stoic tenet that all sins are equal is that common sense is the best guide to justice, at
97-98 :
….. .......  sensus moresque repugnant
atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.
Instinct and tradition are ranged against them [i.e. the Stoics], and so is expediency,
which is in essence the mother of justice and fairness.
43 Indeed the Epicurean view is that it is natural for justice (essentially an agreement not to
harm or be harmed : RS 31) to develop in order to meet the needs of a given society.68 The
Stoics, on the other hand, regarded law as divine reason,69 and thus inflexible. Thismakes
what Horace says at 113-114 appear to be a reaction against Stoicism, and an affirmation
of Epicureanism :70
nec natura potest iusto secernere iniquum
dividit ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis ;
nature cannot tell the unjust from the just as she marks off good things from bad,
what is to be sought and what avoided.
44 And this also lends weight to the thrust of Horace’s anti-Stoic, anti-inflexibility argument
throughout the poem. That his position on friendship is anti-Stoic (i.e. before 96) is also
suggested by the way in which the Stoic view that all faults are equal is initially brought
in  to  conflict  with  his  view  on  friendship :  indeed  this  is  effectively  how  Horace
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introduces the theme of justice. At any rate it would seem that a Stoic should regard a
minor misdemeanour of a friend as tantamount to a serious offence, which is in keeping
with the view that only the wise can enjoy true friendship and thus would not need to
concern  themselves  with  the  business  of  forgiving  or  condemning  a  friend’s
misdemeanours anyway. Thus, given the demonstrably anti-Stoic stance of his argument,
it  seems  likely  that  Horace’s  progression  from friendship  to  justice  shows  an  ironic
awareness of the connection between friendship and justice found in Panaetius, through
oikeiosis and the implementation of ratio, as rendered in Off. 1.11-20.
45 The connection between friendship and justice through the common theme of tolerance
is made explicit in the poem’s conclusion (124b-142). In fact, the link between this last
section  and  the  preceding  polemic  is  incidentally  made  at  123-4a  (si  tibi  regnum/
permittant homines ; ‘if men were to grant you regal power’). This is then picked up by an
attack on the Stoic paradoxes that the wise man alone is rich, handsome and king. Then,
at 137-142, Horace asserts that the Stoic wise man, because of his inflexible views on
justice (and therefore friendship), and indeed his views of himself (as at 124b-133), will in
fact be quite friendless, whereas Horace, in his relative Epicurean tolerance, will never be
short of friends :
ne longum faciam : dum tu quadrante lavatum
rex ibis neque te quisquam stipator ineptum
praeter Crispinum sectabitur, et mihi dulces
ignoscent, si quid peccaro stultus, amici,
inque vicem illorum patiar delicta libenter,
privatusque magis vivam te rege beatus. (137-142)
To put it briefly : while you, king that you are, go to bathe for your farthing with no
escort to attend you save the absurd Crispinus, my kindly friends will pardon me if
I, in my folly, commit some transgression, and I in turn will gladly put up with their
offences,  and  in  my  private  station  I  shall  live  a  happier  life  than  Your  Royal
Highness.
 
Conclusion
46 Horace’s ironic use of philosophical material – his interpretation of a Stoic tenet, which
he apparently upholds from an Epicurean perspective in order to attack Stoic inflexibility
– detracts from any sense of the poet taking himself too seriously, in antithesis to the
Stoic sage ; and supports a pro-tolerance, pro-moderation Epicurean view. This Epicurean
interpretation  of  aequabilitas is  at  odds  with  the  extreme  Stoic  view :  to  the  Stoics,
Horace’s application of aequabilitas would be illogical, since to them aequabilitas would in
fact  be  compatible  with  intolerance :  there  is  no  room  for  human  fallibility,  for
inconsistent behaviour.
47 But Horace wants to champion aequabilitas – as consistency,  balance,  moderation and
tolerance  –  and in  so  doing  he  takes  an aspect  of  Stoic  doctrine  to  enrich his  own
essentially Epicurean views of moderation, tolerance and trust. Although this position
would seem illogical to a Stoic, Horace shows how this Stoic view of aequabilitas is itself
extreme and absurd. Through the marriage of Stoic aequabilitas and Epicurean tolerance
and pistis,  Horace steers  a  path which is  most  sympathetic  to the Epicureans.  In his
discussion of tolerance there is still a touch of irony, though this does not detract from
the unequivocal, Epicurean thrust of his argument. The explicit attack against Stoicism
from 96 suggests that at a re-reading of the satire, his apparent upholding of the Stoic
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tenet of aequabilitas at the outset ought to be taken with a pinch of salt. And this anti-
Stoicism, from 96 to the end, also suggests an ironic awareness of the Panaetian link
between  friendship  and  justice  through  oikeiosis,  as  dictated  by  ratio :  again,  in  his
argument,  Horace sides  with the link between friendship and justice  as  indicated in
Lucretian, Epicurean terms, and ratio is used by Horace to undermine the unreasonable
Stoic position that all sins are equal. Horace’s anti-Stoic agenda is founded on an ironic
awareness – and use – of Stoic thought, which is in turn interpreted from an Epicurean
perspective. He uses the tenet of aequabilitas to lend irony to his own position, but also to
define it as a distinctly personal, anti-Stoic one.
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NOTES
1. Particular  thanks  to  Bob  Sharples,  Emily  Gowers  and  Kirk  Freudenburg  for  their  helpful
comments.
2. Cf. Brown 1993 : 115.
3. Uniformity of behaviour, equity, fairness and equability are listed as definitions of aequabilitas
in OLD ; law justice, impartiality (Lewis and Short).
4. Fraenkel 1957 :  86 ;  Brown 1993 :  123. At 1.1.14,  120 and 1.2.134 Horace rather incidentally
criticises  the  Stoics  Fabius  and  Crispinus,  but  1.3  comprises  a  more  explicitly  anti-Stoic
argument. On the possible political implications of Horace’s anti-Stoicism :  Du Quesnay 1984 :
19-58.
5. Rudd 1966 : 1-35 ; Brown 1993 : 89-99 ; Armstrong 1964 : 86-96 ; 1989 ; 26-41.
6. Rudd 1966 : 277-8, n.46. On the Stoic tenor of much of De amicitia, see Powell 1990 : 18-19. As a
commonplace in Greek (and, later, Roman) thought, the virtue of consistency is mentioned by
Plato, quoting a proverb in Lysis 214c (Rudd 1966 : 27). The advisability of balance and harmony
(more generally) is also found in the Republic 4.443d and Philebus 31c-32b, 64d-65d (Rudd 1966 :
276 n.34). Consistency of character is also promoted by Aristotle (e.g. NE 1166a10-1166b29) : Rudd
1966 :  277-8,  n.45.  With respect  to Satire 1.3,  however,  it  is  important  that  the most  obvious
proponents of consistency were the Stoics (cf. Fraenkel 1957 : 86 n.4) since from 96 to the end
they comprise the target of Horace’s criticism.
7. Dyck 1996 : 281.
8. cf. the stately pace of Aristotle’s megalopsuchos (NE 1125a10-17), and Virgil Aeneid 1.46, where
incedit suggests the dignity of Juno’s movements (Page [1964, first ed. 1894] : 146) ; I owe these
references to Aristotle and Virgil to R.W. Sharples. Also, cf. Seneca De ira 1.1.3, on the hurried
step – citatus gradus – of the angry man.
9. Translations of Satires 1 are from Brown 1993, with adaptations.
10. ... ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates
(Rudd, 1966, 28). Also, cf. Sallust Catiline 15.5: citus modo modo tardus incessus.
11. See below, p. 16 on De amicitia.
12. Horace saw that the Stoics’ extreme position regarding the perfect kind of wisdom required
to be a sage – or, indeed, to avoid being mad and a slave (as in the Stoic paradoxes satirised in 2.3
and 2.7) – was an easy target for satire. 
However, it appears that by this time Stoic ethical theory had in fact tended towards a more
practical approach (though it is still some time before Seneca). From Cicero’s De officiis it is clear
that Panaetius put more emphasis on the process of becoming wise, or as wise as one could be,
rather than the goal of absolute wisdom itself. Clearly, the possible practical applications of Stoic
idealism would still  not deter critics of Stoicism from lampooning these apparently pompous
statements. Indeed some Stoics certainly were austere and sanctimonious, and thus no doubt
perceived as unreasonable, steadfastly standing by these ideals (as far as they could), such as
Cato (Cicero :  Murena 61-2,  74,  Att.  1.18.7)  and,  one could suppose,  the Stoics  Horace himself
satirises : Crispinus 1.1.120, 1.3.139, 1.4.14, 2.7.4 ; Fabius 1.1.14, 1.2.134), and in 2.3 Stertinius, and
Crispinus (more indirectly), again, in 2.7.
13. Gill 1994 : 4608.
14. In books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics ; cf. below, notes 20, 22, 34 and 35.
15. e.g. Rudd 1966 : 1-35 ; Armstrong 1989 : 26-41, Brown 1993 : 89-90, 98, 101.
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16. In Sat. 1.2 Horace’s common sense advice on sexual behaviour involves a combination of the
Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, as to kind of sexual partner, and the Epicurean view that one
should be content with what is easily obtainable by nature, rather than pursuing empty desires :
nonne, cupidinibus statuat natura modum quem,/ quid latura sibi quid sit dolitura negatum/ quaerere plus
prodest  et  inane abscindere  soldo ?  (111-113) ;  also cf.  1.2.73-6.  He recommends women that are
available (freedwomen, meretrices) rather than the unavailable matrona – the pursuit of whom
would be, in Epicurean terms, empty. (cf. below, n. 70).
17. Ep. Men. 127ff : “One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless ; and of
the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural ; and of the necessary, some are
necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself.” RS
29 :  “Of  desires,  some are natural  and necessary,  some natural  and not  necessary,  and some
neither natural nor necessary but occurring as a result of empty opinion.” (tr. Inwood/Gerson
1994, with adaptations).
18. Indeed, Horace’s explicit reference to this tendency in lovers, and his own comparison of
father  to  son,  reflects  the  wider  connotation  of  amicitia generally,  suggesting  a  similarity
between these sorts of relationships ; cf. Catullus, who, in 75, seems in some way to have wrongly
(to his own cost) regarded his relationship with Lesbia as a sort of amicitia : Lyne, 1980, 27-28.
Also, on the relationship between amor and amicitia in Horace : Oliensis 1998 : 151-171.
19. cf. Plato, Republic 474d, Theocritus 10. 24-27 : R. Brown 1987 : 129.
20. As a factor in friendship and justice specifically, the idea of balance also has philosophical
roots : most notably in Theophrastus and Aristotle. Theophrastus’ views are put by Cicero in De
amicitia 61 thus (1.3 : 25) :
cum vero amici utilitas nimio est amplior, honestatis autem nostrae in re non gravi levis iactura est, tunc,
quod utile amico est, id prae illo, quod honestum nobis est, fit plenius, sicuti est magnum pondus aeris
parva lamna auri pretiosus.
‘But when the advantage of a friend is far larger and the sacrifice of our reputation in a matter of
no importance is trifling, then that which is advantageous for a friend becomes more important
in comparison with that which is honourable for us, just as a great weight of bronze is more
valuable  than  a  small  liver  of  gold.’  (tr.  FHS  &G) :  Attic  Nights 1.3 :  52 :  Fortenbaugh,  Huby,
Sharples & Gutas, vol. 2 1992, fr.534, 358.
This  particular  issue  of  conflicting  interests  seems  to  have  certainly  been  developed  by
Theophrastus, having been brought up by Aristotle in the broader sense of weighing obligations
of friendship against other obligations (NE 1160a2ff, 1165b22ff) : Griffin 1997 : 87. In NE 1158b20
Aristotle states that if the gap becomes too wide in respect of virtue and vice between friends,
then  such  a  friendship  cannot  persist.  In  all  these  instances  some  notion  of  proportion  is
important (as it is in Horace).
21. Brown 1993 : 21.
22. One may compare the Peripatetic notion, adopted by the Academics in opposition to the
Stoics, that one should moderate one’s emotions (metriopatheia) rather than aim to be devoid of
emotion altogether (apatheia) : the Academics having adopted the doctrine of the mean from the
Peripatetics (Cicero Tusc. 3. 22/ 4. 38ff). On the Academic Crantor’s (335-275 B.C.) adoption of
metriopatheia : Praechter, 1973 (first published 1897), 33-7. 
23. Pseudo-acro  commented  that  Horace’s  use  of  the  terms  ratio and  fors at  Sat.  1.1.3  were
references to Stoicism and Epicureanism (Dufallo 2000 : 81).
24. e.g., De officiis : 1.12, 14, 20, 50, 107. See below : The Link between Friendship and Justice.
25. e.g., Freudenburg 2001 : 15-23 ; Turpin 1998 : 27-40 ; Dufallo (2000 : 79-90) notes the irony in
Horace’s sometimes paradoxical position as a literary artist in Satire 1.1 ; But he rightly takes the
view that this encourages the reader to question the notion of moderation, of what is satis, and
what is satire (Dufallo notes the punning link between satis, satur, and satura), rather than simply
rendering  the  satire’s  moral  and  literary  position  as  unserious.  On  the  debate  regarding
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philosophical content in Horace’s works, see, for example, Macleod (1979), who regards the role
of  philosophy in  the  Epistles as  significant ;  Mayer  (1986),  who plays  down the philosophical
content. See also Moles (2007), in particular the section on ‘Further Reading.’ 
26. Indeed Dufallo (2000 ; 584) notes that this is itself a satirical allusion to Lucretius – Horace’s
use of humour to make his ethical message more palatable being reminiscent of Lucretius’ use of
the poetic form to impart serious philosophy (1.936 ff) – in that Horace apparently dismisses the
allusion as a joke (1.1.27) : sed tamen amoto quaeramus seria ludo ; but still, let’s put jesting aside,
and conduct a serious enquiry...’
27. Fowler (2008 : 101) rightly maintains, in relation to Horace’s changeable philosophical stance
in  the  Epistles (e.g.  Ep.1.1.16-19),  that  his  portrayals  and  criticisms  of  these  positions,  again
sometimes humorous,  do not  detract  from the Epistles’  philosophical  seriousness ;  rather,  we
should see Horace’s handling of, and enquiry into, different philosophical positions as Socratic,
and further : “Horace’s famous irony is certainly very Socratic, in a Kierkegaardian sort of way :
the irony of the moral philosopher who jokes to be serious (e.g. end of Epistle 1).”
28. Turpin (1998)  thinks we should regard the satirist  in  1.1-3  as  an incompetent  Epicurean
moralist, deliberately displayed as such by Horace. Turpin (128-9) draws attention to the fact that
the  Epicureans  were  in  part  perceived  as  sexual  fanatics  and  thus  1.2,  with  its  Epicurean
terminology  alongside  the  sexually  obsessive  nature  of  the  narrator,  can  all  be  taken  as
deliberately somewhat absurd. To an extent it can be taken as such, and is intentionally funny –
e.g., the talking muto (1.2.68-72), the satirist’s own probable adultery (126-134) – but Turpin does
not consider the subtleties involved in Horace’s  use of  philosophical  material  in terms of its
bearing on the structure and argument of particular satires. Turpin misleadingly cites Epicurus
Sent. Vat. 51 to stress his point about the perception of Epicureans as sexually permissive ; he
does not take account of the entire saying. Sent. Vat. 51 is in fact Metrodorus – not Epicurus – and
the suggestion made here that one can indulge in sexual intercourse provided it does you no
harm in fact, in Epicurean terms, should rather be regarded as generally advising against sexual
intercourse (on the basis that it often will do you harm – as Satire 1.2 illustrates) : “so long as you
do not break the laws or disturb proper and established conventions or distress any of your
neighbours or ravage your body or squander the necessities of life, act upon your inclination in
any way you like. Yet it is impossible not to be constrained by at least one of these. For sex is
never advantageous, and one should be content if it does no harm.” (tr. LS). 
29. cf. Fowler on Epistles 1 (2008 : 99-102), who argues that Horace as it were tries on different
philosophies,  just  as  he  tries  on  different  personae,  to  see  how  they  fit ;  and  so  adopts  a
deliberately personal, ironic, but no less – in terms of its underlying purpose – serious approach
to the main philosophical question of the Epistles : quid verum atque decens... (Ep. 1.1.11). 
30. Whether or not the ‘diatribe’ was recognised as a literary genre at that time is irrelevant
here : the important point is that there was a tradition of public street sermons, usually covering
themes of popular philosophy (such as the folly of greed, adultery and ambition). The ‘diatribe’
was  humorous,  indeed  satirical,  employing  the  device  of  spoudaiogeloion (‘joking  in  earnest’)
which  is  likely  to  have  been  derived  from the  Cynics  (Oltramare  1926 :  15).  From what  has
survived it  seems that the diatribe was colloquial,  avoiding systematic,  logical  argument and
included devices such as fable, obscenity and parody (Brown 1993 ; 5 ; Kenney 1971 : 17-20). Thus
a link between the diatribe and Roman satire, which shares all of these features, is clear. 
31. Hunter (1985) notes the ironic way in which Horace blurs friendship and flattery in Ep. 1.18 ;
but the effect of this blurring is to demonstrate the difficulty – in practical terms a real and
serious one – in judging the appropriate way to behave in the company of a social superior.
32. Brown 1993 : 16. Indeed Shackleton Bailey (1982 : 23) notes that Horace, at 21-25, is criticising
Maenius for doing to Naevius what Horace himself (1-19) does to Tigellius (though Tigellius is
dead and not a friend of Horace’s).
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33. Sent. Vat. 28 : ‘One must not approve of those who are excessively eager for friendship, nor
those who are reluctant. But one must be willing to run some risks for the sake of friendship.’
34. cf. Theophrastus : ‘judge before making friends, not make friends before judging them’ as
quoted by Plutarch De fraterno amore 482b, and referred to by Seneca Ep. 3.2. Aristotle advises
judgment and caution in making friends (NE 8.3.1156b25ff).
35. Although Aristotle (NE 1165b23-36) and Cicero (Amic. 77) both state that if the corresponding
levels of virtue between the two parties in a friendship become incompatible, then the friendship
can be terminated, the Epicurean view was different : when forming a friendship one entered
into a kind of contract (foedus : Cicero Fin. 1.69), and was thus obliged to stick by the friend –
unless the friend actually behaved unjustly to oneself and thus effectively broke the contract.
36. That Panaetius was a source for De amicitia is based on the grounds that there are similarities
between the latter and De officiis,  and on the further assumption, as Powell comments (1990 :
18-19),  that  De  officiis is  entirely  based  on  Panaetius :  Powell  sees  no  evidence  for  naming
Panaetius as such an influence. But some influence, suggested by the link with De officiis, at least
seems likely.
37. The fact that for the Stoics the achievement of wisdom was a process (Sen. Ep. 72.6) meant
that  they  could  follow  the  Peripatetic  view  of  friendship  as  a  possible  means  to  self-
improvement :  i.e.,  through  the  example  of  one’s  friends  (NE 1169b28-1170a13,  EE 1245b1-9,
Cicero  Deamicitia 83) ;  this  Peripatetic  view  is  also  compatible  with  the  case  of  friendships
between sapientes (for the Stoics : for Aristote : μακάριοι – the supremely happy/ σπουδαῖοι – the
good), which would not so much involve self-improvement as the contemplation of one’s friend’s
virtuous actions (and thus by comparison, one’s own actions) ; and, again on a practical level, for
the Stoics friendship was a preferred indifferent (Fin. 3.70) : Griffin 1997 : 6.
38. Konstan 1997 : 113-114.
39. ‘All friendship is an intrinsic virtue, but it originates from benefiting.’ (tr. LS).
40. i.e., that what promotes safety is a natural good : RS 6, 7.
41. Rist (1980 : 28) argues this point from Sent. Vat. 15 – following Bailey’s text – where Epicurus
says  that  one  should  value  one’s  neighbours’  characters  if  they  are  “decent”  (epieikeis).  Rist
suggests that this implies approving of behaviour which is seemly as far as oneself might be
affected by it ; it does not necessarily mean requiring that one’s friends behave justly.
42. Sent.  Vat.  34 :  ‘We do  not  need  utility  from our  friends  so  much as  we  need  confidence
concerning that utility.’
43. Mitsis 1987 : 78-128 ; Annas 1993 : 43-4.
44. Cicero  was  critical  of  the  Epicurean  view  of  friendship  as  derived  from  utility  and  the
enhancement of one’s own pleasure, which he felt debased the idea of friendship (Fin. 1.66, 69,
2.80). But this may be partly due to a misunderstanding of what the Epicureans meant by utility
and, indeed, pleasure.
45. This  would  be  indicated  by  Sent.  Vat. 23  (above) :  δι’  ἑαυτήν  αἱρετή ;  friendship  is
‘choiceworthy for its own sake’ :  Mitsis 1987 : 104 – if we adopt the emended reading here of
‘choiceworthy’ :  LS keep ἀρετή = virtue.  However,  Sent.  Vat. 23 could also be interpreted as ‘
pleasant in itself’ : i.e., choiceworthy because it is intrinsically pleasant, rather than as something
separate  from  pleasure.  O’Connor  (1989 :  65-86)  raises  this  possible  interpretation  although
prefers  a  reading  where  there  is  no  implied  concessive  in  Sent.  Vat. 23 :  every  friendship  is
choiceworthy for its own sake, and (δε)– rather than though – it takes its origin from benefiting :
the second clause complements, rather than contrasts with, the first. Certainly, the idea of its
being pleasant in itself seems most in keeping with Epicurus’ eulogies of friendship in general,
and complements the importance of trust in friendship : this too is pleasant in itself, irrespective
of the actual, tangible benefits on which such trust originally rests.
46. O’Connor 1989 : 176.
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47. Adopting a position of tolerance in line with Epicureanism, and setting this against Stoic
extremism is not dissimilar to what Seneca does in Epistle 3 ;  seneca draws from Epicurus to
question  the  Stoic  ideal  of  autarkeia,  which  he  then  supports,  highlighting  its  practical
application and its compatibility with friendship. Horace uses Stoic aequabilitas (in a practical
context) to then attack Stoicism and to support Epicurean moderation. Again, on friendship in
Epistle 3 Seneca appeals to the avoidance of extremes, to balance, and, at the end of the letter, to
nature ;  Seneca also quotes Horace Satires 1  in order to strengthen his moral  arguments (Ep.
 86.13 = Sat. 1.2.27/ 4.92 ; Ep. 119.13-14 = Sat. 1.2.114-16 ; Ep. 120.20-21 = Sat. 1.3.11-17 (Henderson
2004 : 117-118). Notably, at Ep. 120.20-1, Seneca quotes Sat. 1.3 in order to conclude the letter on
the wisdom of aequalitas.
48. Gowers 2003 : 73.
49. Although  the  general  and  important  point  is  that  one  should  not  over-react  to  minor
transgressions, it is possible that Horace, if only incidentally, is drawing attention to the fact that
there is such an imbalance in the way in which people are judged for crimes simply because of
their status. This seems possible, at least, bearing in mind Horace’s background and the fact that
his father had been a slave.
50. cf. Turpin 1998 : 134.
51. See above, n. 12.
52. Cf. Satire 1.1 where the connection between mempsimoiria (unhappiness with one’s own lot,
and envy of the lot of others) and greed appears to depend to some extent on the traditional
inter-relation of these two subjects in popular philosophy (Fraenkel 1957 : 92-4).
53. Zeno, fr. 224, SVF i.54 ; Diog. Laert . 7.120. Ruch 1970 : 518-521, compartmentalises Horace’s
argument into ‘moral’  (29-75)  and ‘philosophique’  (76ff),  and thus differentiates  between the
more  everyday  observations  and  advice  as  regards  friendship,  and  the  more  specifically
philosophical question of grading faults and propounding a practical view of justice as to some
extent dependent on present social circumstances.
54. The concept that one’s natural concern for oneself spreads outwards, by degrees, to include
(ultimately) all human beings is expressed by Hierocles in Stobaeus 4.617-673, 11 Wachsmuth = LS
57G. On the connection between oikeiosis and justice : Schofield, 1999 : 760-768.
55. Ibid. : Cicero De finibus 3.63. De officiis 1.55-6.
56. Schofield 1995 : 191-212.
57. As at Off. 3.27, which is likely to represent the view of the second century BC Stoic, Antipater :
Schofield 1995 : 199-201.
58. De tribus autem reliquis  latissime patet  ea ratio,  qua societas  hominum inter  ipsos  et  vitae quasi
communitas continentur : cuius partes duae, iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua viri boni
nominantur,  et  huic coniuncta beneficentia,  quam eandem vel  benignitatem vel  liberalitatem appellari
licet.
‘Of  the  three  that  remain  the  most  wide-reaching  one  is  the  reasoning  (ratio)  by  which  the
fellowship of men with one another, and the life, are held together. There are two parts of this :
justice, the most illustrious of the virtues, on account of which men are called good ; and the
beneficence connected with it,  which may be called either kindness or liberality.’  (tr.  Atkins,
Griffin 1991)
59. Panaetius stresses that reason (ratio) is what is distinctive about human society (Off. 1.11-12) :
Schofield 1995 : 203.
60. Mitsis 1987 : 106.
61. Long 1983 : 310.
62. Brown 1993 : 121.
63. More  purely  stylistic  similarities  include  Horace’s  use  at  1.3.111  ( fateare  necessest)  of  a
subjunctive form commonly found in Lucretius (e.g. 1.399 esse in rebus inane tamen fateare necessest
), vincet 115 = ‘prove’, cf. Lucretius 5.735 (Brown 1993 : 124) ; cf. Sat. 1.2.134.
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64. Brown 1993 : 124.
65. Ibid.
66. e.g.,  Mayer  2005 :  249.  Though  in  fact  the  obscenity  cunnus itself  is  not  found  in  satire
anywhere else other than in Horace’s Satires : Adams 1982 : 81.
67. On  this  passage  as  an  analogy  of  the  history  of  Satire  –  the  progression  from  physical
confrontation to verbal : Keane 2006 : 53 ; as an analogy of aspects of Horace’s life : Gowers 2003 :
75.  Campbell  (2003 :  218)  notes  that  Horace’s  take  on  the  emergence  of  civilisation  from
animalistic origins is more violent than Lucretius’. This would seem to be in keeping with the
satirical context and Horace’s references to violence in Satire 1.2.
68. For the Epicurean view of justice as conventional : RS 31, 32, 33 ; Lucretius DRN 5.1019-1027,
1143-1160 ; as mutable, depending on circumstances : RS 36, 37, 38 ; as a deterrent against would-
be wrong-doers : RS 34, 35.
69. LS 67R, 67S.
70. cf. Sat. 1.2.75-6, ac non fugienda petendis/ immiscere, (Brown 1993 : 12). cf. also Sat.1.4.115-6 : ‘
sapiens,  vitatu  quidque  petitu/  sit  melius…’  Horace  is  differentiating,  in  an  Epicurean  context,
between the empty and the solid, RS 29, what is naturally easy to obtain and what is naturally
hard to obtain (ad Menoeceum 130), and thus what is to be sought and what avoided (ad Menoeceum
129ff, 132).
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